Miami Was Ready to Beat Cincinnati. Was Chuck Martin?

Miami was ready to beat Cincinnati. That is what makes this hurt so much.

The RedHawks did not spend Saturday hoping to survive a more talented rival. They returned the opening kickoff for a touchdown, built a 28-7 halftime lead and generated 410 yards at 7.3 yards per play. David McComb threw for a career-high 334 yards. Maleek Huggins looked like a genuine difference-maker. Grant Lyons played one of the best defensive games of his career.

This was not another case of Miami being physically overwhelmed by a Power Four roster. The upgraded roster was good enough to win the Victory Bell.

The question left behind by a 35-31 loss is whether Chuck Martin’s established instincts are aggressive enough to finish games of this magnitude.

Miami Proved This Was Not Pitt

The final score belongs in the loss column beside the 59-14 defeat at Pitt, but the performances should not be treated as remotely equal. Miami looked outclassed and unprepared in Pittsburgh. Against Cincinnati, it looked capable of winning from the opening kick.

Smith’s 98-yard touchdown return created the perfect start. The defense immediately forced a three-and-out, and the offense followed with a four-play, 67-yard touchdown drive. McComb found Damarion Witten for 34 yards, Rodney Nelson ran for 11, Braylon Isom gained 10 through traffic and Lazaro Rogers finished the possession with a 12-yard touchdown run.

Miami later drove 91 yards for McComb’s six-yard touchdown run and closed the half with a six-play, 65-yard possession that ended with Huggins’ 36-yard touchdown catch. The RedHawks entered halftime leading 28-7 because they had played like the better team.

That distinction matters. The NIL investment, retention work and transfer additions have changed what Miami can put on the field. Cincinnati did not expose an enormous talent gap. Miami’s own inability to finish exposed the remaining gap between competing in a major game and winning one.

One Yard Changed the Game

The defining decision arrived at the beginning of the fourth quarter.

Miami had driven 74 yards and reached fourth-and-goal from the Cincinnati 1 while leading 28-21. Martin sent out the field-goal unit, and Kellan McLaughlin converted from 19 yards to make it 31-21.

The decision has a reasonable explanation on a whiteboard. A field goal restored a two-score lead. Martin said afterward that he wanted that two-score margin, did not seriously consider going for the touchdown and believed Miami’s offense would score again.

The context makes that logic much harder to accept.

Cincinnati had scored touchdowns on consecutive third-quarter possessions. Its offense was gaining confidence, while Miami’s defense had already spent much of the half trying to slow the comeback. McComb was also moving with a noticeable limp. Assuming Miami would create another clean scoring opportunity was far from guaranteed.

Miami was one yard away from restoring a 14-point lead. Its offense had already produced three touchdown drives, including possessions of 91 and 65 yards. If the attempt failed, Cincinnati would have taken over against an energized defense at its own goal line.

Whatever Martin intended, the choice communicated caution at the exact moment Miami had an opportunity to seize the game again.

That does not mean every fourth-and-goal must become an automatic attempt. It means this particular game had reached the point where three points were unlikely to be enough. Cincinnati eventually proved that they were not.

Cincinnati Offered Another Chance

Even after Miami settled for the field goal, the defense created the opportunity that should have ended the comeback.

Lyons sacked JC French IV, forced a fumble and watched Roosevelt Andrews III recover at the Cincinnati 41. An unsportsmanlike-conduct penalty moved the ball to the 25. Miami had regained possession in scoring territory while leading by 10.

The RedHawks came away with nothing.

A first-down wildcat snap lost 12 yards. An incomplete pass and a short gain followed, and McLaughlin missed from 45 yards. Earlier in the third quarter, Miami had also taken possession at the Cincinnati 31 after Lyons’ fourth-down sack and produced only a missed 36-yard field goal.

Those two possessions cannot be reduced to one coaching decision. Protection failed, penalties had already disrupted the offense, and the kicking game left points on the field. But together they illustrate the larger problem. Cincinnati repeatedly gave Miami chances to regain control, and Miami repeatedly failed to convert them into separation.

The Details Were Not Good Enough

Martin acknowledged the offensive confusion afterward and accepted responsibility for it. Miami exhausted all three second-half timeouts by the 5:32 mark of the fourth quarter, repeatedly needing time to resolve pre-snap problems. The RedHawks also committed seven penalties for 57 yards and fumbled four times, with Cincinnati recovering only the final one.

Those details matter because the margin disappeared one play at a time.

Cincinnati cut the lead to 31-28 with a 73-yard touchdown drive. Miami responded by reaching midfield but punted with 3:46 remaining. The Bearcats then traveled 85 yards in only 2:17, converted a fourth-and-2 and took the lead on Cole Tabb’s 53-yard touchdown run with 1:29 left.

Miami still had a final chance. McComb moved the offense to the Cincinnati 33, but a strip sack ended the possession and the game.

The defense deserves part of the criticism. Cincinnati accumulated 446 yards, controlled the ball for more than 33 minutes and scored touchdowns on four consecutive meaningful second-half possessions. When the offense and special teams failed to put the game away, the defense could not produce the final stop.

But this should not become an effort to locate one young defensive back and make him carry the collapse. Cincinnati found favorable matchups and attacked them. Miami’s responsibility was to adjust, provide help and prevent the same vulnerabilities from deciding the game.

What Miami Showed Itself

Martin’s best postgame line was also the most accurate:

“We showed ourselves today what we could become; we have not become it.”

That is the correct place to leave this game.

Miami is not the team that was humiliated at Pitt. It is also not yet the team that knows how to close Cincinnati after taking a 21-point lead. Both truths are visible in the same afternoon.

McComb’s career-high passing performance showed how dangerous this offense can become. Huggins delivered the explosive receiving threat Miami needed. Witten added 84 yards. Smith changed the game immediately. Lyons and Tyler Dikos consistently affected the quarterback.

That is why the Hype Check does not collapse to one brick. Miami provided more evidence of its ceiling in this loss than it did during the 45-7 win over Holy Cross.

The frustration is that the evidence arrived inside a game Miami should have won.

The upgraded roster was ready for the moment. The coaching staff must prove it can finish the next one.